[Stoicism] - Dịch Seneca (76): Về phẩm cách, thứ duy nhất tốt đẹp của con người!

Lời tựa:
                      
Như đã giới thiệu trong series, Seneca thực sự là nguồn cảm hứng Stoicism của mình. Đọc Seneca không chỉ là về triết học mà còn là một trải nghiệm nghệ thuật, khi những bài học, triết lý quan trọng được phản ánh qua những hình ảnh quen thuộc, bình dị và đời thường, thể hiện cái tinh tế trong quan sát của một thiên tài với sự từng trải của cuộc đời.
                                          
Với hy vọng giới thiệu Stoicism đến với các bạn trẻ Việt Nam, xin gửi tới các bạn bản dịch những bức thư quan trọng nhất trong cuốn "Moral Letters to Lucilius", tác phẩm đã làm nên tên tuổi của Seneca và là một trong bộ ba cuốn sách nền tảng của Stoicism.    
                                                        
Do không phải anh dịch thuật, nên bản dịch này hoàn toàn tập trung vào việc truyền tải thông điệp và hy vọng có thể giúp bạn cảm thấy dễ dàng hơn trong việc tiếp cận với bản tiếng Anh, để có thể thấy cái hay cái đẹp trong việc sử dụng ngôn từ của Seneca (dù thực ra bản tiếng Anh cũng chỉ là một bản dịch). Một anh bạn người Ý của mình đã chia sẻ Seneca được đưa vào chương trình giảng dạy tại Ý như một bậc thầy về việc sử dụng ngôn từ. Vì vậy, xin cam đoan tất cả những gì khiến bạn cảm thấy trúc trắc từ bản dịch là bởi khả năng hạn chế của mình, và rất mong nhận được đóng góp của các cao nhân để bản dịch được hoàn thiện hơn. 

Bức thư số 76

Một người khi đã hiểu rõ rằng mục đích của mình là cao đẹp thì hoàn toàn có thể cười nhạo chính những sự chế giễu ấy.

Bạn không nghi ngờ gì về việc nó là thứ tốt đẹp; bạn chỉ băn khoăn đó là thứ tốt đẹp duy nhất mà thôi. Vậy thử nghĩ lại xem: nếu một người sở hữu tất cả những thứ khác, như sức khỏe, tiền bạc, huyết thống hoàng gia, đi đến đâu cũng được chào đón bởi vạn người, nhưng bị tất cả cho là người xấu, bạn sẽ lên án hắn. Ngược lại, nếu một người không có bất cứ thứ gì mà tôi nói đến ở trên, không tiền, không mối quan hệ, không dòng dõi danh giá, không phả hệ đầy tự hào, nhưng lại được tất cả thừa nhận là con người đức hạnh, bạn sẽ chấp nhận và tán dương anh ta. Vậy nên đó là thứ tốt đẹp duy nhất của con người, bởi ai sở hữu nó đều đáng được ca ngợi ngay cả khi anh ta không có những lợi thế khác, trong khi một người không có nó thì sẽ bị phê bình và khước từ ngay cả khi anh ta sở hữu tất cả mọi thứ khác.

Không ai trong số những người bạn nhìn thấy mặc áo tía (những người quyền cao chức trọng thời bấy giờ) là thực sự may mắn, nhiều hơn người diễn viên may mắn khi được trao cho vai vua chúa và quần áo hoàng gia trên sân khấu, khi họ trình diễn một phong thái khệnh khạng trước khán giả với quần áo được làm phồng lên và những đôi ủng diễn kiểu cách; nhưng ngay khi họ bước xuống sân khấu những thứ ấy được cởi bỏ và họ trở về với vóc dáng bình thường. Không ai trong số những người có của cải và chức vị thực sự vĩ đại. Tại sao bạn cho anh ta là vĩ đại? Bởi vì bạn tính cả bệ đỡ trong việc đánh giá anh ta. Một người lùn thì không thể trở nên cao ngay cả khi ở trên đỉnh núi; và một người cao lớn vẫn sẽ cao ngay cả khi bạn đặt anh ta ở dưới hố.

Đâu có thứ đau khổ chịu đựng nào là mới mẻ đột ngột

Tất cả chúng đã đến với ta trước đây

Trong tâm trí ta, ta đối mặt, và biết phải hoàn thành chúng như thế nào cho ra một con người (trích thơ Virgil)

From Seneca to Lucilius
Greetings
1 You swear you will become my enemy if I don’t inform you about
every one of my day’s activities. See how forthright I am in my life
with you. I will share even this: I am taking philosophy lessons! Today
is the fi fth day I have gone to school to hear the philosopher
lecturing from two o’clock onward.
“What, at your age?” Why not? What could be more foolish than
failing to learn a thing simply because you haven’t learned it earlier?
2 “So I’m supposed to take after the youthful squires?”* I’m doing quite well by my advancing years if I don’t shame them any more
than that. Here is a school that admits people at any age.
“Is this what old age is for—to go chasing after the young?” Shall
I go to the theater in my old age; shall I ride in my sedan chair to
the Circus, be present at every gladiatorial match, and yet blush to
visit a philosopher? 3 You should keep learning as long as you lack
knowledge; or, if we believe the proverb, as long as you live. And that
is just what this learning is for: you should keep learning how to live
for as long as you live. On that point I have something to teach as
well. “What’s that?” you ask. It is that even the old have something
to learn.
4 But every time I enter the school, I am ashamed for the human
race. As you know, I have to pass right by the theater of Naples on
my way to the house of Metronax.* Th e theater is packed. A cheering
crowd decides who is a good fl utist; the trumpeter has a following,
and so does the announcer. But in the place where the question is
who is a good man, where one learns what a good man is, the seats
are almost empty, and the general opinion is that those who are there
have nothing better to do. People call them useless drones. Well, I
don’t mind that sort of ridicule: the criticism of ignorant people is
not something to get upset about. One whose aims are honorable
should scorn their very scorn.
5 Make haste, then, Lucilius. Move quickly, lest what happened
to me should happen to you, and you become a pupil in your old age.
But the real reason you should make haste is that the study you have
embarked upon is one you can scarcely learn thoroughly even if you
do become an elderly learner.
“How much progress can I make?” you say. As much as you attempt.
6 What are you waiting for? No one attains wisdom merely
by chance. Money will come of its own accord; public offi ce will be
conferred on you; popularity and infl uence will perhaps be accorded
you without any action on your part; virtue, though, will not just happen
to you. Th e work it takes to recognize it is neither easy nor short;
but the eff ort is worth making, for by it one will take possession of
every good at once. For there is but one—the honorable. You will
fi nd nothing real, nothing sure, in those things that reputation favors.
7 I will now explain why the honorable is the sole good, since you
judge that I failed in my earlier letter to achieve that end, praising the thesis rather than proving it. Here, then, is a concise version of
what has been said on the subject.*
8 Each thing is so constituted as to have its own excellence.
Fertility commends the vine; fl avor the vintage; swiftness the stag.
About a mule, you ask how strong its back is, for the only function of
a mule is to carry burdens. In a dog, the chief quality is keenness of
scent if it is to track the game; speed of foot if it is to chase the game
down; and boldness if it is to dart in and harry. In each, its best quality
ought to be that for which it is born and by which it is assessed.
9 What, then, is the distinctive property of a human being? Reason.
It is by reason that the human surpasses animals and is second to the
gods. Th erefore perfected reason is the human’s distinctive excellence;
everything else is shared with animals and plants.
Th e human is strong; so are lions. He is beautiful; so are peacocks.
He is swift; so are horses. I am not remarking that he is surpassed
in all these attributes: my inquiry is not what attribute is greatest in
humans but what it is that is particular to humans. Th e human has
a body; so do trees. He has the capacity for impulse and voluntary
movement; so do beasts, and worms too. He has a voice—but how
much louder is the barking of dogs; how much higher the cry of the
eagle; how much deeper the bellow of bulls; how much sweeter and
more melodious the trilling of the lark! 10 What is special about a
human being? Reason. When that is set straight and made complete,
it achieves the blissful fulfi llment of human nature.
Th erefore if each thing is worthy of praise and arrives at the culmination
of its own nature when it perfects its own particular good,
and if the particular good for a human is reason, then if a person
perfects his reason, he is worthy of praise and has attained the culmination
of his own nature. Th is perfected reason is called virtue, and
is also the same as the honorable.
11 Hence the one thing that belongs solely to the human is the
sole good of the human. For we are now asking not what the good
is but what the human good is. If nothing but reason belongs solely
to the human, this will be his sole good. But this good must be
weighed in with all other attributes: if anyone proves to be bad, he
will be blamed; if good, he will be approved.* Hence that by which
a human being is approved and blamed is his primary and only distinctive
attribute.

12 You do not doubt that this is a good; you doubt whether it is
his sole good. If someone should be found who has all other advantages—
health, riches, a fi ne family tree, an entry hall crowded with
visitors—but it is agreed that he is a bad person, you will criticize
him. Conversely, if someone has none of those things I listed—neither
money, nor throngs of clients, nor noble birth, nor a long line of
ancestors—but it is agreed that he is a good person, you will approve
of him. Hence this is indeed the sole good of the human, since one
who has it is to be praised even if he is lacking in other advantages,
while one who does not have it is condemned and rejected even if he
is well supplied with other advantages.
13 Th e situation is the same for humans as for things. What we
call a good ship is not the one decorated with expensive paints, nor
the one whose prow is tipped with gold or silver, nor the one whose
hold is ornamented with ivory, nor the one laden with royal treasure
and the bursaries of nations, but rather the steady vessel, stoutly made
with joints that keep the water out, sturdy enough to withstand every
assault of the sea, swift and unfazed by the wind. 14 What we call a
good sword is not the one with a gilded baldric, nor the one whose
sheath is studded with gems, but the one whose cutting edge is keen
and whose point will slice through every kind of defensive armor.
With a ruler, you do not ask how pretty it is but how straight it is.
Everything is praised for that feature which is distinctive of it and
for which it is obtained. 15 So in a human too, the pertinent consideration
is not how much land he has under the plow, not how much
capital he has to invest, not how many clients attend him, not how
expensive a bed he lies in, not how transparent his drinking goblet
is but how good a person he is. Yet he is good only if his reason is
fully developed, straight and right, and adapted to the intent of his
nature. 16 Th is is called virtue; this is the honorable and the sole
good of the human being. For since only reason perfects a human,
only reason makes him perfectly happy. But that by which alone he
is made happy is his sole good.
We say too that those things which proceed from virtue and are
connected with it—that is, all the activities of virtue—are themselves
goods. Still, virtue is the sole good, because there is no good without
it. 17 If every good inheres in the mind, then whatever strengthens, exalts, enlarges the mind is a good. But virtue makes the mind stronger,
loftier, and more expansive. For other objects of our desire also
lower the mind and weaken it, and when they seem to elevate us, they
are actually puffi ng us up and deceiving us with empty wind. Th e sole
good is therefore that by which the mind is made better.
18 All the actions of an entire life are governed by consideration
for what is honorable and what is base; reasoning about what to do
or not do is guided accordingly. Let me explain. A good man will
do what he believes is honorable, even if it is arduous, even if it is
dangerous. Conversely, he will not do what he believes is base, even
if it brings money, or pleasure, or power. Nothing will frighten him
away from what is honorable; nothing will entice him toward what
is base. 19 So it is only if there is no good other than virtue and nothing
bad except what is shameful that he will pursue the honorable
unconditionally and avoid the base unconditionally, and will look to
those two in every action of life.
If virtue alone is unperverted and it alone maintains its own
condition, then virtue is the one good that cannot turn out to be
anything other than good. It escapes all risk of change. Foolishness
creeps toward wisdom; wisdom does not relapse into foolishness.
20 I have said (as perhaps you remember) that there are some
who by unconsidered impulse have trodden beneath their feet those
objects the common crowd either wants or dreads. Examples can be
given of one who threw away his wealth, one who set his hand on fi re,
one whose smile did not abate under torture, one who shed not a tear
at the funeral of his children, one who met death without dismay, all
because love, anger, or desire drove them to court such dangers. If a
brief steeling of the mind can do so much when roused by the spur
of the moment, then virtue can achieve all the more, being rigorous
not on some sudden impulse but equally on all occasions, constant
in its strength. 21 It follows that those objects that are scorned quite
often by the imprudent, and always by the wise, are neither good nor
bad. Virtue itself, then, is the sole good, which walks proudly between
opposite fortunes with lofty scorn for both.
22 If you accept the view that something besides the honorable
is a good, then every virtue will have a hard time. For no virtue can
be maintained if it looks to anything beyond itself. If that is the case, it is contrary to reason,* on which the virtues depend, and to truth,
which does not exist without reason. And any view that is contrary
to truth is false.
23 You admit that the good man must of necessity be supremely
respectful toward the gods. For that reason he will calmly tolerate
anything that happens to him, for he knows that it has happened
through the divine law by which all events are regulated. If that is
the case, then in his eyes honorable conduct will be the sole good; for
that includes obedience to the gods, neither raging against the shocks
of fortune nor complaining of one’s own lot but accepting one’s fate
with patience and acting as commanded.* 24 If there is any good
other than the honorable, then we will be dogged by lust for life and
for life’s equipment—and that is intolerable, unending, ill-defi ned.
Th us the sole good is the honorable, which has a limit.
25 We said that if things in which the gods have no share, like
money and public offi ce, are goods, then human life will be more
blessed than the lives of the gods. Now add this consideration: if
indeed our souls linger on when released from the body, a happier
condition awaits them than while they are embodied. But if those
things that we use through the body are goods, they will be worse off
after their discharge, and that is contrary to our intuition that souls
that are free and released into the universe are happier than souls
locked up under siege. 26 I had also said that if those things are goods
that pertain no more to humans than to animals devoid of speech,
then animals too will partake of happiness, and that is impossible.
For the sake of the honorable, one ought to put up with absolutely
anything; but if there were some good besides the honorable,
there would be no such obligation.
27 I pursued these topics at greater length in my earlier letter;
here I have compressed them, giving a brief overview. But a view of
this kind will never seem to you to be true unless you raise your mind
to a higher level. Ask yourself this: if circumstances should require
you to die for your country, purchasing the lives of all its citizens at
the cost of your own, would you stretch out your neck not just willingly
but even gladly? If you would, then there is no other good, for
you are abandoning everything to have this.
See what great power there is in the honorable: you will die for
the state, even if you realize the need only just before you are to do it. 28 Sometimes from an extremely beautiful object one experiences
great joy even in a tiny space of time; and although no profi t from
the act performed accrues to the one who is deceased and removed
from human life, still there is satisfaction in the very contemplation
of the deed ahead. A just and courageous man, when he envisions the
benefi ts of his death—the freedom of his homeland, the safety of all
those for whom he lays down his life—is at the height of pleasure,
and is gladdened by his own danger.* 29 But if one is deprived even
of this joy that the doing of this greatest, last deed provides, even
then one will still plunge down into death, fi nding satisfaction in
acting correctly and with due devotion. Confront him with many
reasons to be dissuaded; say to him, “Your act will soon be forgotten
and will win hardly any gratitude or esteem from the populace.”
He will reply, “Everything you are saying is external to my task. My
concern is with the task itself. I know that task is honorable, and so
I follow wherever it summons me to go.”
30 Th is, then, is the sole good, as recognized not only by the perfect
mind but also by the mind that is nobly born and of good natural
disposition. Other things are fl eeting and changeable. Possessing
them is an anxious matter: even when a kindly fortune piles them
on, they weigh heavily on their owners. Always they are a burden;
sometimes they are even a mockery.
31 Not one of those whom you see wearing the purple is fortunate,
any more than actors are fortunate when assigned to bear the
scepter and royal robes on stage, when they parade before the audience
in wide garments and platform shoes, then immediately go off ,
remove their footgear, and resume their proper stature. Not one of
those whom wealth and public offi ce have taken to the top is truly
great. Why does he appear great? You are including the pedestal in
his measurement. A dwarf is not tall even if he stands on a mountain;
a giant will keep his height even if he stands in a pit. 32 Th is is our
mistake; this is how we are fooled: we do not assess people by what
they are but add to them the trappings of their station. Yet when you
want to make a true assessment of a person and know what he is like,
strip him naked. Let him shed his inheritance, his offi ces, and all of
fortune’s other lies. Let him take off even his body. Contemplate his
mind and see what is his quality and what his stature: is he great
through his own store or someone else’s? 33 If his gaze is steady as he looks upon the fl ashing swords, if he knows it makes no diff erence
to him whether he breathes his last through his mouth or through
his opened throat, then call him happy—if, when he hears of prison
and exile and all the needless terrors of human thoughts, he feels no
concern but says,
“No aspect of these labors,
Sibyl, arises new or unforeseen
by me: I grasped it all before this day,
and in my mind I faced and fi nished all.*
You, Aeneas, make such proclamations on this day only; I make them
always to myself, and since I am human, prepare myself for human
events.”
34 Misfortune’s blow falls lightly when the mind is prepared for
it. But the foolish and those who put their trust in fortune fi nd that
every aspect life presents is new and unexpected. For inexpert minds,
a large portion of their misfortune lies in the novelty of it. 35 Evidence
of this is that when they have grown used to the circumstances
they had considered harsh, they endure them more patiently. For this
reason the wise man accustoms himself to misfortunes that are yet
to come: he takes what others make light through long endurance
and makes it light through long refl ection.* We sometimes hear the
voices of the inexpert saying, “I knew this was waiting for me.” Th e
wise man knows that everything is waiting for him. No matter what
happens, he says, “I knew it.”

Farewell.

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