APOLOGIA OF PREJUDICE Introductory text - English

Prejudice is a common experience for all of us, we encounter it personally in our daily lives between ourselves and objects, between ourselves and other people, we can witness it in interactions between distinct groups, and observe it in different societal structures. This feeling or observation of unfairness or inequality can be of various categories, whether it be racial, national, or appearance-based prejudices. This essay is an attempt to explore and serve as an introduction into understanding such topic.

The conventional definition of prejudice is "a preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience." However, this definition seems to overlook the perspectives of both the person or group holding the prejudice and the individual or group being prejudged. It (the definition) establishes a link between these two parties, labeling it as prejudice, which is described as "spontaneous" or without reason. While this definition may hold true from the standpoint of the individual experiencing the prejudice, it may not accurately reflect the reality for the person exhibiting the prejudice or for those examining the phenomenon.

From the perspective of the person manifesting the prejudice, their preconceived opinion may simply be mere fact or reality. For example, if Woman B considers Man A to be creepy, it is simply a fact in her mind, and she may have reasons supporting her belief (an a priory synthetic statement in a sense). However, this does not validate the prejudice, turning it into a valid statement just from the fact that Woman B has reasons supporting her beliefs, in contrary to the definition proposing that to be a prejudice an observation must be spontaneous (that is to say the statement may still be a prejudice after given the fact that it is not spontaneous). Nevertheless, the fact that Man A perceives this judgment as unfair or prejudiced does not also mean that the judgment is actually a prejudice in common linguistical sense. Even if Woman B cannot provide a concrete reason for her opinion, the judgment is not invalidated alone on that ground. It remains a fact that Woman B holds a certain opinion of Man A, Man A feels prejudiced against, and it is insufficient for observers to automatically classify the relationship as unreasoned, uncaused, or spontaneous.

This raises an intriguing point about how our society, particularly Western societies, typically approaches the concept of prejudice. Often, we focus solely on the perspective of the individual or group being prejudged, overlooking the viewpoint of the alleged holder of prejudice. This tendency leads us to instantly assume that the relationship is without cause and unreasonable, emphasizing only one side of the prejudice and then generalizing it into a global and objective phenomenon. This approach is prevalent in politics across all sides and positions.

Consider police shootings. Some individuals perceive a pattern of police officers targeting individuals with darker skin tones and attribute prejudice and often malice to such actions due to the perception of prejudices as spontaneous and uncaused (so therefore in this case it must be pure hatred or malice being thing in itself). This perception can create a sharp division, establishing a clear friend-enemy distinction between those perceived as having malicious intentions and those who do not. This does not mean the action of establishing such distinction is somehow wrong or immoral, or that the undertaking of the concept means the de-establishment of such distinction (the establishment of this distinction is in reality essential – see Carl Schmitt), what it means is that it goes nowhere in understanding the nature of prejudice itself and by itself is just as much of a phenomenon.

The crucial point is that using such a definition and applying it means rejecting the possibility of fully understanding the concept, which is counterproductive. It is unproductive to simply assume spontaneity in the concept of prejudice, as suggested by its conventional definition. In psychology, prejudice is recognized to be composed of different components that warrant comprehensive understanding.

What the conventional definition of prejudice got right – and by that I mean what was useful from the original definition - was the establishment of a structure. On one side is the prejudged, on the other is the prejudice holder, and between them a link that is the judgement, called the prejudice. What makes this judgement a prejudice is determined by all parties involved. For the perceiver, the judgement is a reality, for the judged the judgement is a prejudice. The mechanism by which the prejudice is recognized in any sort of comparison judgement by each party is the concept of fairness (a better word than fairness would be a lack of differentiation). The perceiver supposes the judgment to be fair and equitable: A possesses quality B that makes A stand out and belong to a category (existence of differentiation), so even if it is a prejudice, it is valid for the perceiver. The party being judged perceives the judgement as unfair and inequitable: A is not possessive of quality B (lack of differentiation), and the prejudice is invalid. So, what is left for the observer of such relationship?

One way through which the prejudice can be remedied is the study of the truth by verification. The truth here is an observable reality, it is the layer of things that are seeable, attestable, and clear. It is what is ‘objectively true.’ From the relationship we extrapolate the two contradicting ideas. On one hand we have the claim that A is B, and on the other: A is not B. The prejudice is wrong if A is not B, and right if A truly is B.

Prejudice though, is not as simple as and goes far beyond a simple provable accusation. Psychologists and philosophers for long have broken down the concept of prejudice into parts. One is the stereotype, the causation function of the prejudice. Next comes the prejudice, which is the position. And the last is discrimination – judgement in action or judgement realized.

For people like Simone de Beauvoir, the stereotype arises through social conditions. This was for her the basis for gendering – the division of roles and functions between the sexes. For de Beauvoir, the stereotype has a dominating effect on the individual, a woman who has been raised and encouraged since childhood into the gendering of womanhood will find great difficulty in escaping such, for the stereotype itself imposes upon the individual, making her what she is. This is where, at least for de Beauvoir, prejudice arises. Similar to such case, a Black individual may grow up being taught to be inferior, having internalized that stereotype, ending up being of inferior character himself. An ugly man having internalized his unattractiveness will hardly ever find his way out of such situation,… Regardless of whether the stereotype is to be correct, to people like de Beauvoir, it has an internalization effect. Stereotyping goes from being a generalization to being a case-specific phenomenon, or rather, the application of a generalization upon the individual, steering the individual itself towards that generalization. Prejudice in this case is not a contradiction, nor is it an accusation, or a mere relationship, but a real and true object that itself has its links and effects upon being, it is always in action. For de Beauvoir, the prejudice is hence true, however contradictory that might sound.

Views like that of de Beauvoir, however, are not a hard science, an analytic judgement or an a priori. It went no further than to provide a view of how a prejudice could function in reality (and it does), subsequent research on implicit bias proved nothing beyond the point of light association, and hence proved nothing of knowledge and action mechanism, nor did it make a clear and coherent moralistic point on the phenomenon. de Beauvoir was clearer – however - on the roots and origins of this prejudice, which is what could be considered refreshing about her. Coming out of the tradition of existentialism and phenomenology, drawing from the likes of Hegel, the philosopher asserted that prejudice – and in her case of study – prejudice against women - has its roots in the will of men, stemming from nature and history in a soft materialistic sense: mankind throughout history has struggled for power, and ‘the physically strong (men) seized all rights.’ Here de Beauvoir set off a naturalistic, undeniable, and unavoidable ‘cause’ for the matter: nature made men stronger physically. The next step laid out by de Beauvoir was the formation of the will: that men want power and uses that power in order to oppress women. Here the whole structure is now separated and levitating above the original naturalistic cause, the prejudice against women is now one step removed from the one true – and must be true – natural. Hence her view on how the oppression of women came to be was from the will of men.

What de Beauvoir set out to accomplish was a system of prejudice understanding from the viewpoint of phenomenology. That is without any preconception. From starting in nature as a priory, but to then deriving and separating from it a will, to establishing prejudice as a result of that will, and then finally to understand how such prejudice perpetuates – or continue existing – having been uprooted from nature. de Beauvoir, however, did not consider the structure as a one whole. For she in her philosophy denies the totality of the essence, subjugating it to be a part in her phenomenology. A woman for de Beauvoir is not because of her essence, but because of her becoming. This is new in the sense that it suspends the phenomenon of prejudice and in this case prejudice against women from the essence, making it almost independent and something more intricate than that of ‘just-being,’ and more intricate than a yes-no question. For example, a woman’s role as mother and wife and hence the prejudice that views and attach to her such quality is not because of any inherent function of the female individual but because of norms and societal pressure leaving prejudice as a movement according to Simone de Beauvoir.

‘A woman is not born but made’ is probably her most famous quote from the Second Sex. Here de Beauvoir defined an existence i.e., women – or the state – the prejudice of women - as not a totalizing being, but rather a process, or a change. This sentence captures best her total philosophy in Second Sex, as this can be a conclusion of her on the state of prejudice that we can take note of. de Beauvoir was not any major part of the post-modernist movement in France during her time of writing, but her writings proved valuable in challenging and investigating the key concepts and structures of that time in true post-modernist fashion. A comparison could be drawn from this philosophy of de Beauvoir with that of her contemporary Michel Foucault on the state of humanity being a ‘becoming’ instead of being one essence. However, the view that something is not of a solid essence, but a process and a becoming is not new, and these two statements of objects being in motion and being stationary are not incompatible either. de Beauvoir herself structurally ‘hinted’ at this from her object of prejudice itself being true and real (in form) but at the same time of non-necessity (in content), that it exists in form but it does not have to be so in content, that it is not of essence but of construction. The history of this in Western philosophy goes all the way back to pre-Socratic times, starting with Heraclitus.

This view of something being a becoming or a process started in modern Western philosophy with Heraclitus. Heraclitus is best known with the famous metaphysical statement pieced from three ‘river fragments:’

Or to be less of a sophist, ‘no man steps in the same river twice.’ This is the concept of ‘flux,’ which Heraclitus was ultimately famous for. This describes all objects as constantly changing and in a process. Man who steps in the river the second time would be different, the water is also different, all great world-historic facts and personages appear twice, first time as tragedy, second time as farce (Marx on Hegel)… Something that has been ceased to be, something that will be will cease to be, what is left is a movement (Schopenhauer)… The same can be applied for prejudice formation both in history and phenomenologically, that change being the only constant. ‘Things are not.’ This flux carried itself into latter philosophy through Plato, all the way to modern philosophers the likes of Schopenhauer, Hegel, Marx, up through to postmodern philosophers: de Beauvoir as mentioned above or Gilles Deleuze who spoke of pure difference.

This is where his second concept comes in, the concept of ‘Logos.’ ‘Logos,’ for Heraclitus, is used in various places all throughout his fragments. For once this concept of ‘Logos’ might even be more central to Heraclitus than that of flux. What it is - is a kind of ‘world rationale’ – a kind of pure and absolute consistency. This seems contradictory as on one hand we have the inconsistency, and on the other we have the absolute consistency. But in the words of Alain Badiou: contradiction is real. But even this has nothing to do with such contradiction and there is hardly a contradiction at all. What ‘logos’ is – is the ‘consistency of inconsistency.’ Logos, in form is something that can be recognized by itself, but in content can only be recognized by the something that is not it. This ‘logos,’ in the texts of Heraclitus, does not only imply the order in disorder or the rationale behind change, but also the ‘oneness’ and the ‘totality’ against what essentially is the world fragmentation of nihilism. This logos of Heraclitus subordinates every being into its vicinity, and excludes everything else, condemning them of inconsistency and nonexistence: ‘all entities come to be in accordance with this Logos.’

In de Beauvoir’s concept of this stereotype-prejudice-discrimination, prejudice is a movement, not only a movement as a process internally from stereotype to discrimination, but also a movement in history that continually reproduces itself. The mistake is only when one takes the identity of Logos out of this change.

Martin Heidegger suggests that the modern tendency to prioritize calculative, instrumental reasoning, or rather the subsummation of all under the technae, over more contemplative and meditative forms of engagement with the world has led to a sense of alienation and disconnection from the deeper sources of meaning and truth that requires intense penetration. This estrangement from the more primordial modes of truth is linked to what Heidegger characterizes as the "forgetfulness of being" – the ‘original sin’ – in Heidegger’s words - and the confusion in modern society.

According to Heidegger, the removal of this ‘Logos’ from flux, in the sense of losing touch with the deeper ontological sources, or departing from the abstraction into meaning and significance, has contributed to a pervasive sense of nihilism in modern existence. Nihilism, in this context, means the undermining of traditional sources of value, of purpose, and of significance, leading to a wide sense of meaninglessness and existential disorientation. In the sense we can relate the situation to the words of Marx, it is the movement of ‘All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.’

All this is to say that yes, prejudice is a process of differences, but in itself is identity proper, for identity is nothing but the identity of differentiation (Logos). And what that means is there is a ‘Logos’ for prejudice. The Logos of prejudice in history begins with a supreme rationale, having an essence: prejudice, firstly, is, and by being, it is subsumed by the Logos. Whatever the change and process must be through this Logos, the structure is not a levitating body above a ground, but one that is strung together. The prejudice is also at the same time a passing act between what has already been described as the stereotype and the discrimination, it is simply the movement, not to and from only, but also between such objects, prejudice penetrates the stereotype and the discrimination. And by having a Logos and essence, this build, shape, and reflect the objects of which the whole structure acts upon: these are the prejudged, and the prejudice holder.

Here we can set out a way of understanding prejudice: prejudice in itself, through the discussion of de Beauvoir and the application of Logos – is

Prejudice can therefore not be understood as a mere error, or a negative, but a real phenomenon and observation that hides and obscure the reality ‘Logos’ behind it. There is hence a reason to understand the examination of prejudice as a way to look into and seek and ‘undisclose’ to a degree the most basic truth of the world.

Now consider prejudice in its most literary meaning as a pre-judgement and a passing act between the prejudged and the judger, the only thing preventing the prejudice to become a full statement of knowledge would be the state of undiscovered reason, or a reason not fully realized. Prejudice as always lie in a state of a doxa. Philosopher Alexander Dugin has this to say about the doxa: that it is untruthful, doxa is all that is not true, but also ‘how truth manifest itself in the world of untruth,’ that doxa is ‘not alithea or truth but an external conceit of truth.’ Doxa as untrue, but not the antithesis of truth either, nor does it ‘coincide with falsehood.’ Dugin added: ‘any phenomenon already has a doxa in itself.’ Prejudice in the same sense has a doxa to it as much as that the specific prejudice is a real actual phenomenon from which we can derive an episteme - knowledge. And in that sense, every judgement of episteme is by itself a doxa – a prejudice that is punctured with paradoxes – gaps.

Prejudice, hence, can not be viewed as an object that only partakes in pure teleology. What it actually is – is a real movement in the human collective psyche. This movement opens or conceals the boundaries of all the what-is?, whether that be class, racial, national, gender,… and attribute to them a differentiation. The movement conceals within itself nature - the ‘Logos’. What this means is that the prejudice can not be viewed as a pure negative, it being active and an object worthy of epistemological investigation makes it just. In the sense that it is not a falsehood but a concealment. It is such that it is an illusion but structured in reality and shapes the fabrics of reality itself. Prejudice, circling back to part 2, is real, and must be real. It would be unproductive for now to go into each category of prejudice and disclose some of the real tendencies in truth that each prejudice contains, but I would hope this discussion of philosophical jargon was a necessary introduction to kick start one’s discovery to his own prejudice of interest.