Because on Tuesday we talked about Justice in Economic Philosophy class which is one of my fav subjects, I just wanna make this as a Study Note preparing for finals as well as a regular kind of note as this lecture from Mr. Richert is something I consider pretty valuable for some 20-somethings like myself.
“Justice” has been one of the most discussed concepts since time immemorial because the portfolio of humanity’s goals would be unimaginable without it. It is not uncommon for contradictory conceptual understandings to be characterised by the fact that conflicting parties refer to different constituent aspects of justice and thus tend to “talk at cross purposes” rather than exchange arguments on the same level.
The first component of “social justice”, “social”, is not used in its correct sense, which relates to integration into the life of a community, but as a synonym for “financial”: when, for ex, the wages for people with low incomes are raised at a below average rate, one speaks of “social injustice”, but means “financial injustice” as the lower wage groups suffer a relative financial loss, which however, does not necessarily lead to social losses.  The euphemism of the “socially weak” refers to the “financially weak”, in other, simple and understandable terms: the “poor”. Significantly, politically correct published opinion contradicts the criterion of linguistic symmetry by speaking not of the “socially strong”, but of the “rich”.The use of “social” in this context is also distorting: the socially weak are often actually financially strong aka the wealthy who, for ex, because of higher levels of professional and thus social mobility have to accept reduced levels of close social contacts, while the so-called “socially weak” really count among the socially strong because they might have an extended, freely available time budget at their disposal.This is not to deny the fact that financial opportunities also determine one’s possibilities for participation in social life, but equally the obvious trade-off between high income and more time for one’s social life should not be left unconsidered. One thinks, e.g of the decision-making calculations of young people who often tend to give up the goal of income maximisation because the sacrifice of free-time is seen as too high a price to pay. The equating of “social” with “financial” disguises the fact that in many areas, a social life is independent of wealth, that the former can even be in substitutive relationship with a good financial situation.
The second component “justice” is used as a rule in the sense of absolute “equality”. As one can find in Aristotle’s “Nicomachic Ethics” : “Quarrels and disputes much more arise because either equal people get and enjoy equal things or unequal people get and enjoy equal things”.“Equal distribution” is thus not an absolute but a relational variable which cannot be considered in isolation, but requires a standard for comparison.
For ex, no majority basis for calling for equally high incomes for all members of society under the cloak of justice. This realisation of this demand would fail because of the lack of regard of possible standards of comparison such as performance, willingness to perform or need. Only on the basis of the same level of one of these three of two people would the equal distribution of income be a goal worth pursuing for large parts of population. Unequal levels of standards of comparison consequently imply in contrast an unequal income distribution.
The use of the expression “social justice” is misleading because it concentrates on financial aspects but awakens social associations, unfounded because it demands equality of distribution without justifying it, and incomplete because it is in no way obvious why justice should be only be judged from either “social” or “financial” point of view. “Social justice” is thus neither “social” nor “just”, but rather equated with “financial equality”.
Now that the inadequacy of the concept “social justice” has been demonstrated, the object of justice should be justly - not necessarily equally - distributed. In order to reduce the potential for conflict in discussions of justice, it is useful to divide justice into two main groups: ex-ante and ex-post justice. In the terminology of political economics, one could express the difference as follows: ex-ante justice is justice at the start-line aka starting conditions; ex-post justice is justice at finish -line aka result-oriented.
Arguing purely from the perspective of ex-ante justice includes as a possible intended outcome that people who do not exploit their starting position, which is equal to that of other members of society, can, and indeed, should, die of starvation. But moral systems securing majority support in the world, that would see such an outcome as not “just”. Thus an exclusive focus on ex-ante justice should be rejected.
The extreme orientation towards ex-post justice which only considers equal results would permit the outcome of “scroungers”, who despite better opportunities live at the expense of others, being able to achieve the same level of utility as people who despite the most adverse starting conditions are a benefit to society because of their own efforts. This outcome also does not conform to value systems with majority support. Thus an exclusive focus on ex-post justice should also be rejected.
As the one-sided orientation towards either ex-post or ex-ante justice can lead to outcomes that are not seen by majority of the population as “just”, one can conclude that it is imperative for a promising discourse on justice examine both varieties.